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FACILITATORS AND OBSTACLES OF 
INTERCULTURAL BUSINESS COMMUNICATION 
FOR AMERICAN COMPANIES IN CHINA: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE UPS CASE
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes how the execution of business strategy for global en-
terprises is shaped by the dual challenges of communicating in a different 
national culture and working in a changing economic environment. The ar-
ticle develops a framework from the UPS case in China to illustrate the key 
components of strategy for US companies operating businesses in China. The 
article proposes that Chinese-American communication effectiveness can be 
achieved through overcoming fi ve obstacles: cultural multiplicity, relation-
ship/task orientation, time concept, business style difference, and language 
use, while utilizing fi ve facilitators: pragmatism, gender equality, English, 
American pop culture, and a “big country mentality.” 
INTRODUCTION
Companies of all sizes are becoming global players physically and virtually. 
However, the reality of successfully executing a global business strategy in a 
particular geographic, cultural, and linguistic location continues to be a chal-
lenge. Global business strategies on paper as compared with in practice can be 
quite different because of the challenges of intercultural communication and 
changing business environments. In this article, we propose a framework of 
cultural facilitators and obstacles for Chinese-American cross-cultural com-
munication for American companies conducting business in China, which we 
then illustrate with the case of UPS’s China entry and expansion.1
1 UPS: United Parcel Service, a Fortune 500 company headquartered in Atlanta, USA. 
Founded in 1907 as a messenger company in the United States, UPS has grown into a 
multi-billion-dollar corporation by focusing on the goal of enabling commerce around 
the globe. UPS is the world’s largest package delivery company and a leading global 
provider of specialized transportation and logistics services. UPS manages the fl ow of 
goods, funds, and information in more than 200 countries and territories worldwide 
(UPS Website, “About UPS,” 2010; CNN Website, 2010).
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There are many well-established motivations and strategies for companies 
to invest abroad (Deresky, 2008). Cultural and economic factors confronted in 
a particular market can either facilitate or obstruct the implementation of any 
specifi c strategy. We specifi cally focus on the interaction between economic 
and cultural facilitators and obstacles in the China market for US companies. 
From the economic perspective, key factors in the Chinese context include 
timing of entry, sectors and locations that are open to foreign fi rms for expan-
sion, the stage of Chinese economic reforms, the legal-regulatory environment 
at both central and local governmental levels, the priorities of policies, and 
changing market conditions that include income levels, consumer tastes, and 
market participants. From the cultural perspective, key factors in the Chinese 
context include regional cultural differences, linguistic barriers, One Child 
Policy consequences, the Chinese mentality, business style differences, and 
relationship/task orientation. Despite the general framework that we introduce, 
it needs to be recognized that in some cases whether these factors are obstacles 
or facilitators to investment varies by industry and region. 
How the Chinese economy and society evolve affects business culture. 
For example, when the horizontal nature of a market economy develops in 
China, the need for guanxi, or relationships, to get things done becomes 
subtle and less apparent. Foreign companies can increasingly use the market 
to obtain resources or to market their products or services, instead of rely-
ing heavily on go-betweens and favors as in the past. This is not to say that 
guanxi is no longer important as the Chinese market matures, but rather that 
guanxi may become more of a facilitator than a necessity for international 
business in China.
This research was approached with a theoretical foundation incorporating 
various communication theories applied to the Chinese-American business 
context, including Hofstede’s fi ve cultural dimensions, Hall’s context analy-
sis, Ting-Toomey’s Face Negotiation argument, Schulster’s task-relationship 
dichotomy, and Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner’s cultural 
orientation. A framework for analyzing Chinese-American business com-
munication was developed, and then applied to the case of United Parcel 
Service (UPS).
This study is a result of a multi-phase and multi-case longitudinal case 
study project with various American multinational corporations with Chi-
nese operations. We have conducted in-depth or focus group interviews 
with upper-level managers of Inductotherm, The Sports Authority, Home 
Depot, and UPS. We conducted the most in-depth and extensive interviews 
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with managers of UPS in both Atlanta and Shanghai. Our research method 
was qualitative, and our inquiry was guided by “why” rather than “what” 
(Lindlof and Taylor, 2002) in regards to the effectiveness of intercultural 
business communication.
In spring 2007, a total of four in-depth interviews were conducted with 
UPS’s vice presidents and supply chain managers, each for about two hours, 
in the UPS Atlanta, Georgia, headquarters. The interview guide focused on 
their perception, experience, and insights on Chinese-American business com-
munication. Then, in the summer of 2007, a three-hour focus group interview 
with sixteen executives at UPS Shanghai was conducted in Shanghai, China, 
by the authors. In addition, an interview was conducted in summer 2010 with 
Mr. James Xiong of UPS Hub in Shanghai Pudong International Airport 
about UPS’s progress in China. These UPS interviews generated over 500 
pages of transcripts. The content of the transcripts was analyzed for patterns 
of strategies and obstacles in intercultural business communication between 
the Americans and the Chinese. With the participants’ consent, all names 
cited are real names with the positions held at the time of the interviews.2
The next section introduces the context of UPS’s business history and its 
entry into China as part of its international business strategy. The third section 
outlines a set of facilitators and challenges in the US-China business context 
that virtually all US fi rms deal with to one extent or another. The fourth section 
applies this set of general principles in order to understand UPS’s business 
expansion in China. The fi nal section concludes with observations about US 
companies’ business communication strategies and obstacles in China, as well 
as how China’s economy has changed over this time period.
THE CASE OF UPS IN CHINA 
By many measures, UPS has been successful in China. This success has oc-
curred despite being in a service industry that has faced more restrictions in 
2 We would like to thank all those from UPS who spent time with us sharing their 
knowledge and views on UPS’s global development. We especially thank David Ab-
ney for sharing his thoughts to the Executive MBA class at Mercer University during 
the summer, 2007, and for helping us contact his colleagues in Asia. As head of Asia 
Operations, Richard Loi was instrumental in arranging all of our interviews in China. 
Eric Chung and Edward Choi met with us on multiple occasions. We are grateful to 
the entire Shanghai and Guangzhou groups for their contributions in person and with 
follow-up information. In Atlanta, we especially thank Ken Lee and Jim Thompson 
for their time and insights. 
146 GAO AND PRIME
China for longer than have other sectors, such as manufacturing. This case 
analysis was generated from in-depth individual and focus group interviews 
both in Atlanta and Shanghai helping to identify success factors at UPS by 
showing how the company has utilized facilitators and dealt with obstacles 
with respect to both the economic-business environment and intercultural 
communication. 
UPS was established in 1907 in Seattle as a messenger service. For seventy 
years the company’s focus was building the domestic US market, state by 
state. Once UPS offered service to every address in the continental United 
States, the company expanded to Canada in 1975 and to Germany in 1976. 
This process of expansion was challenging in part because the leadership 
thought they could do business in these countries as they had done in the 
United States. They quickly discovered otherwise. Through learning and 
training, UPS has grown into a global multinational company with operations 
in over 200 countries. Approximately 16% of the company’s employees are 
overseas, and about 25% of revenues are generated outside of the United 
States. This transformation is a remarkable achievement, especially in light 
of the fact that much of the top management has been with the company for 
three decades or more. 
Along with the growth in global markets, UPS redefi ned its mission to 
include information and money transport, along with goods. This coincides 
with their strategy of building UPS into an integrated global supply chain 
company. According to the former chairman, Jim Kelly, these are examples 
of the payoffs of the company’s conscious move to emphasize innovation 
rather than replication, even though replicating successful core businesses 
had been a winning strategy for many years (Kirby, 2002).
The success of UPS mirrors the growth in international trade worldwide. 
The fact that the US economy has been one of the key drivers of that trade has 
helped UPS in their global expansion.3 In many countries, the main operation 
for UPS involves exports-imports rather than domestic package delivery. 
This is also the case in China, although UPS is positioning itself to grow as 
the domestic Chinese market grows, pending resolution of regulation issues 
and other challenges. Nonetheless, UPS approaches domestic markets as a 
“local company,” even as it prides itself on being a “global” company with 
procedures and policies that are consistent wherever UPS operates.4
3 Interview with Kenneth L. Lee, Vice President of Security, 31 Oct. 2007, Atlanta. 
4 In our discussions with UPS employees in China, the company was consistently 
presented as a global company rather than a US or a Chinese company. 
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These UPS characteristics expressed by representatives of the company 
fi t with the defi nition of a transnational corporation (TNC) (Deresky, 2008). 
A TNC reorganizes its activities globally to lower costs while also creating 
strategies to be responsive to local markets. Recently the procurement side of 
UPS has also begun to function in a way consistent with the characteristics of 
a transnational fi rm.5 For years the US and European operations purchased 
such things as automotive parts, mailing envelopes, offi ce supplies, and in-
voices regionally or locally for local use. Now UPS has begun to look at what 
the company buys as a global organization, and manages these purchases, 
in some cases outsourcing their production of various categories of goods. 
They began with their customer package supplies, and with this initial phase 
of moving procurement globally, UPS saved $30 to $35 million annually.
UPS fi rst entered China in 1988 (see Table 1). At that time their options 
were limited, as China was not yet a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and economic reforms were still in the early stages. Some companies 
that entered at this time eventually pulled out, or scaled back, until condi-
tions improved.
Right after UPS entered the Chinese market in 1988, conditions wors-
ened quickly. High infl ation plagued the economy as a result of its rapid 
growth. Government fi nances were not in good shape, as revenue collection 
could not keep up with growth in incomes. Public perceptions of rampant 
corruption combined with eroding real income for most people led to grow-
ing discontent and demonstrations by offi ce and factory workers, as well as 
students, throughout the month of May 1989. The violent ending to these 
demonstrations on June 4th raised many questions about how, and if, China 
would continue economic reform.
By 1992, when the Chinese top leadership decided to go forward with 
reforms, rapid and substantial increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) be-
gan. It was in this environment that UPS set up its three representative offi ces 
in 1994. At this time UPS targeted the growing export market as a supplier 
of package shipment services, but setting up distribution within the domestic 
market was still not possible. Then, two years later, UPS established a formal 
joint venture with the main Chinese distribution company—Sinotrans.
As the rules concerning joint ventures were relaxed, in December 2004 
UPS acquired its Chinese joint venture partner for US$100 million. Starting 
5 Interview with Jim Thompson, Global Direct Sourcing Group manager, 7 Nov. 
2007, Atlanta. 
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Table 1: UPS in China: 
 A Summary of Major Events and the Business Context
Date Event Business Environment
1988 UPS enters China with partner 
Sinotrans via an agency agreement
Partner relationship is required
1994 UPS opens representative of-
fi ces in Beijing, Shanghai, and 
 Guangzhou
Reforms in progress after Deng 
Xiaoping made his famous journey 
to southern China in early 1992 and 
jump started growth after a period 
of uncertainty following the June 
4th Tiananmen incident in 1989; 
substantial increases in foreign 
investment began
1996 UPS and Sinotrans establish for-
mal joint venture
1999 The JV extends service to 21 cities
2001 The JV expands to 40 cities
—UPS begins direct fl ights 
between China and the US; UPS 
gains 12 fl ights between China 
and the US
China joined the WTO in Decem-
ber 2001
2003 UPS begins working with Yangtze 
River Express
—UPS establishes Shanghai 
as its Greater China District 
 headquarters
WTO agreement included allowing 
foreign companies to arrange their 
own distribution networks rather 
than being required to use Chinese 
companies 
2004 UPS employs nearly 400 people 
in China
2005 UPS takes over international 
express operations from Sinotrans 
in 23 locations
—UPS employment grows to over 
4,000 people in China
—UPS is selected as a 2008 
Olympic sponsor
First in industry to operate a wholly 
owned company in China; this 
option was not possible earlier be-
cause of regulations within China; 
the WTO agreement laid a basis for 
negotiating more foreign company 
participation in services; the Hong 
Kong CEPA agreement allowed 
UPS to form the wholly owned 
company one year ahead of others
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Date Event Business Environment
2006 —UPS begins daily fl ights 
 between China and Japan
—Begins retail operations with 2 
Express Stores in Shanghai
—Begins direct fl ight service 
between China and Europe
—UPS Direct Sourcing group 
begins exploring procurement 
 options in China
China’s economy continued to 
grow fast—over 10%, despite 
attempts to create more balance 
across sectors and geography, and 
to slow growth some
2007 Shanghai Airport Authority and 
UPS sign agreement for construc-
tion of a UPS International Air 
Hub based at Pudong Airport
By the end of the year infl ation had 
jumped to over 4%, and exports 
were starting to slow. Product lia-
bility issues earned global  attention
2008 UPS PVG Hub at Shanghai 
 Pudong International Airport 
opens.
A total of US$125 million has 
been invested in this hub, which 
makes UPS the largest forwarder 
in Shanghai in 2010
The global fi nancial crisis swept 
over the world, but China and India 
seemed to be immune to this crisis 
overall. Some export-oriented 
factories in China closed
2009 Total UPS global revenue is at 
US$37.9 billion.
Shanghai PVG Hub sorts through 
17,000 pieces per hour with one-
step operations
The global economy in fi nancial 
crisis, but the Chinese govern-
ment’s $846-million stimulus plan 
still gave China a 9% growth rate 
for GDP
2010 UPS becomes the largest for-
warder in Shanghai in 2010. UPS 
exports twice as many goods as it 
imports at PVG
Chinese economy expected to have 
an annual GDP growth of 8.7%
Table 1, continued
from January 2005, UPS assumed complete control of operations in 23 loca-
tions, starting with Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Qingdao. 
Together, the 23 operational regions covered 200 cities and accounted for 
over 80% of its delivery service in China. Thus, UPS became one of the three 
major international delivery services in China along with DHL and FedEx 
(Denlinger, 2004). By 2010, with its newly constructed Shanghai PVG Hub 
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at the Pudong International Airport, UPS became the largest forwarder in 
Shanghai, according to Mr. James Xiong, the Gateway Manager of UPS Hub 
at the Pudong International Airport on July 20, 2010. 
Effective intercultural communication during and after UPS’s merger 
with Sinotrans was one of the most challenging aspects of the UPS expan-
sion in China, especially as the company grew from about 400 employees 
to over 4,000 in a couple of months. We argue that UPS has been trying to 
maximize the facilitators and minimize the obstacles for effective intercultural 
business communication in the midst of these rapidly changing business and 
economic conditions.
CULTURAL FACILITATORS AND OBSTACLES
Embedded in challenges with training, sales, and overall profi tability in a 
foreign market is the ability to articulate home company goals in a cultur-
ally different environment. American companies need to develop mutual 
understanding and suffi cient skills to communicate effectively within varying 
linguistic and cultural contexts. Terpstra (1991) argues that the multiplicity of 
language use and the diversity of cultures in the world economy have a con-
straining infl uence on the operation of international business. Globalization of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) has created a need for better understand-
ing of business processes that are embedded in a network of subsidiaries and 
headquarters located in environments with differences in national, regional, 
racial, and ethnic cultures. 
Scholars have written about the difference between cultures from various 
perspectives (Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2004; 
Ting-Toomey, 1999). However, there is a lack of literature that synthesizes a 
systematic framework for effective Chinese-American communication. US-
China trade dominates the Asia Pacifi c region. Approximately 19% of US 
imports originated in China in 2009, with total US imports from China equal 
to $296,373 million, making China the United States’s largest trading partner 
for imports and its second largest trading partner overall (US Census Bureau, 
2010). China was also the second largest recipient of foreign investment in 
2009, second only to the United States, with US fi rms falling into the top ten 
investing countries (US–China Business Council, 2010).
In the culturally divergent business environment of MNCs, many factors 
impact their internal and external communication, including the employees’ 
language, culture, mindset, personal experience, philosophies of life, and 
ways of doing business. We applied the fi ve obstacles and fi ve facilitators 
of Chinese and American intercultural business communication to help us 
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interpret interviews from the UPS case. The fi ve obstacles are cultural mul-
tiplicity, relationship/task orientation, time concept, business [communica-
tion] style difference, and language use (see Figure 1).The fi ve facilitators 
are pragmatism, gender equality, English, American pop culture, and a big 
country mentality (see Figure 2). These will be discussed in turn. 
Figure 1: Chinese-American Communication Obstacles
O1: Cultural Multiplicity
Synthesizing the theories of Hofstede (Culture’s Consequences, 1980; 
“Hofstede’s Five,” 2010), Hall (1976), Ting-Toomey (1999), and Copeland 
and Schuster (2006), we know that China has a collectivist, hierarchical, 
high-context, and relationship-oriented culture. In contrast, the United States 
has an individualistic, horizontal, low-context, and task-oriented culture. 
Concerning business, the collectivist culture emphasizes group interest, 
conformity, and harmony; the hierarchical structure of a collectivist society 
demands respect for elders, managers, and professors that discourages chal-
lenges to authorities. China’s high-context culture creates an indirect and 
subtle communication style in which only a third of the message is spoken 
while two-thirds is embedded in the context, including codes in nonverbal 
behavior, social status, and solidarity of relationship between the speaker and 
listener. The ability to decode the contextual message is critical to success in 
correctly understanding a Chinese business partner. Americans who use the 
direct communication style will very possibly miss much of the contextual 
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message sent from the Chinese partner, while a subtle-minded Chinese person 
will second guess his/her American partner and misunderstand the American 
(Gao, “Invisible,” 2005). In addition, Hofstede’s individualism index shows 
that the United States has an individualist culture that encourages individual 
differences, success, and happiness, while China has a collective culture, 
which prefers group solidarity and group outcomes (Bond, 1991).
Beside the macro difference between American and Chinese cultures, both 
countries have a multiplicity of regional cultures and subcultures separated 
by geographical regions, demographics, and levels of economic development. 
For example, Jim, a 57-year-old US expatriate working in UPS stated the 
importance of coming to China with no assumptions: 
Do not form opinions too quickly. When you come to China, when you 
fi rst see things, you really have to say that it happens at this place this time. 
China is not one country; it’s many countries, both in time, space and in 
social class. The Chinese culture is not three-dimensional; it’s probably 
seven-dimensional, with geographical region multiplied by historical eras.
American or Chinese business people should never assume that the macro 
Chinese or American cultural models that they learned prior to their overseas 
trip can completely apply to a group of Chinese or Americans from a particular 
region or of a particular race/ethnicity. This particular group could be very 
different from the “standard” Chinese/American culture that is presented in 
textbooks, training manuals, and tour books. It is critical to keep an open mind 
while interacting with cultural others on an interpersonal level for cultural 
learning in the real sense (Gudykunst and Kim, 2003).
O2: Relationship or Task Orientation
Copeland and Schuster (2006) categorize cultures by whether they are 
relationship-oriented or task-oriented. American culture is task-oriented, 
while Chinese culture is relationship-oriented. In a culture where harmony 
is the center of focus advocated by Confucius since the sixth century BC, 
relationship is of particular importance to the Chinese communication men-
tality and style, or guanxi. In Chinese etymology, guanxi is a combination of 
two Chinese characters: guan (“door, gate, or passage”) and xi (“connection, 
group or organization”). The combination of these two Chinese characters 
refers to relationships, connections and “access to a group, community or 
organization” (Hackley and Dong, 2001, Wong and Leung, 2001). Guanxi 
requires intentionality and reciprocity for social capital exchange within a 
“whom-you-know” rather than “what-you-know” framework (Gao, “Compar-
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ing,” 2008). An important implication of guanxi for business is that Chinese 
partners care about establishing a mutual relationship with Americans on an 
interpersonal level before contracts are signed.
In an MNC, if an American employer takes an interest in the Chinese 
employees’ personal lives in addition to caring for their career development, 
the employees are very likely to develop loyalty to the employers. Chinese 
people also respect hierarchy more than Westerners do. For instance, it 
is hard for Chinese employees to imagine that their Western counterparts 
interact with their bosses on a fi rst-name basis. The Chinese tradition is 
that you must demonstrate obedience with no argument to the orders from 
those who are superior in rank. Even if one does not agree with a Chinese 
partner, disagreement should be expressed in an indirect way to protect his/
her face (Gao and Ting-Toomey, 1998) and to protect the relationship that is 
expected to be reciprocal (Gao, “Comparing,” 2008). American businesses 
need to understand the “face” concept and try to “give face” to their Chinese 
partners whenever possible by providing gifts, being punctual, showing 
respect, and learning the Chinese language and culture. Chinese people are 
usually hospitable, and such hospitality has certain resemblances to Southern 
hospitality in the United States.
O3: Time Concept 
Time concept difference is one of the major obstacles for Chinese-American 
communication. Such differences are three fold: expectation for the future, 
time perspectives, and awareness of time zones. First, Hofstede and Bond 
(1984) show that the main discrepancy between Chinese and American cul-
ture is in their Long Term Orientation (LTO) index, which is also known as 
the Confucianism dynamism. People in China prefer to plan their lives (not 
schedules) well ahead. For example, they set long-term goals to save money 
for purchasing a house and their children’s education. This is part of the rea-
son why China has one of the world’s highest savings rates. On the contrary, 
Americans prefer short-term planning and immediate rewards. Americans 
like to enjoy things now, and are willing to borrow for these short-run goals.
Yet it may seem paradoxical that the Chinese plan their lives with a long-
term view, but seem to be “unstructured” in their daily schedules. This is 
because the Chinese are on a polychromic time (P-time), while the Americans 
are on a monochromic time (M-time). As a result Americans seem to have 
lots of unknowns in schedule building when in China. Multiple appointments 
could be arranged at the same hour in case some do not show up, and some 
visitors will simply pop in without appointments. Day planners, while made 
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in China for Americans, are rarely used in China. Chinese visitors often are 
viewed by their American counterparts as not planning ahead enough in 
scheduling for appointments prior to a trip to the United States, not to mention 
schedule complications brought about by the US visa application process. 
Americans tend to be more punctual then the Chinese; however, in big cities 
such as Shanghai and Beijing, business people are becoming very punctual as 
well, given their own new, fast-paced lives. Paul, a US diplomat in Shanghai, 
mentioned that since he found there was much uncertainty about the daily 
schedule in China, he formally arranged 30% of his daily time, and left 70% 
free to cope with uncertainties. One needs to learn that things do not occur 
on schedule as often as in the United States (Gao, “Overcoming,” 2006). 
Logistically speaking, transnational business people are aware that the 
United States and China are located in different time zones and they need to 
calculate in order to make phone calls at convenient times, if possible, for 
the receiver. Further, both countries are located across several time zones. 
However, the collectivist culture in China dictates that all of China uses one 
time—Beijing time; while in the continental United States, there are four 
time zones. In addition, there is a summer daylight saving time in the United 
States. When people from China try to do business with the United States, they 
need to take time zones and summer daylight saving time into consideration. 
O4: Business Style Difference
The American task-oriented culture and the Chinese relationship-oriented 
culture generate different business styles. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 
(2004) state that the United States has a specifi c-orientated culture, and 
American people opt to separate their work from their private life. Business 
people usually will not call their partners’ home phones. In contrast, for 
the Chinese, work and private-life are linked, a perspective from a diffuse-
orientated society. Closely related to the guanxi concept, the Chinese extend 
friendship beyond the workplace, which blurs the work-life boundaries. The 
Chinese often invite business partners for dinner together and during such 
wine’n’dine and karaoke occasions, business deals are reached and closed.
Technology use is another major difference in how the Chinese and 
Americans communicate. In China, almost every business person has a cell 
phone and text messaging is very commonly used for business, while in 
the United States, BlackBerrys and iPhones are common and people like to 
leave voice messages for business. Emails are used in both countries, but in 
the United States they are far more common in the business sphere than in 
China. Given these differences, we see that a Chinese person might hesitate 
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and not leave an email message while an American might wonder why he/
she is not receiving a response in a timely manner.
Hofstede’s value dimensions show America is a horizontal society, while 
China is a hierarchical society. People in the United States regard individu-
als as more or less equal, while people in China accept the fact that power is 
distributed unevenly. Thus the Chinese show more respect for others based 
on their social status, age, and social position. Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner (2004) state that China is known as an ascription society where people 
are rewarded on their status in the hierarchical social ladder, compared with 
America where emphasis is placed on individual achievement.
Having an individualistic society, Americans face many obstacles in 
dealing with the group-oriented Chinese. For example, Americans, often 
“go Dutch” when paying bills and might fi nd it diffi cult to have to pay for 
the group after a dinner in China. The in-group versus out-group distinction 
is another structural phenomenon for the Chinese communication style. 
An in-group member is one with whom one needs to maintain a reciprocal 
relationship, and an out-group member is simply an acquaintance. To get 
things done in China, a business person usually needs to become an in-group 
member with the decision-maker for the desired transactions (Gao, “Over-
coming,” 2006). As a cultural stranger, it is only natural that an American 
business person is seen and treated as an out-group member by the local 
Chinese. There are strategies, however, that out-group members can adopt 
to transform themselves into in-group members, such as third-party referral, 
guanxi cultivation (Gao, “Comparing,” 2008), and benefi t sharing. However 
such a transformation process takes a long time, and there is no guarantee 
that a local Chinese person will award in-group membership to an American, 
or a Chinese-American.
O5: Language Use
Despite the fact that there are more people in China learning English than the 
total US population, not all Chinese speak English. Though many Chinese 
business partners have learned English and try to speak it, not all Chinese 
partners can communicate in English. Their levels of English profi ciency 
vary based on their age, region, and educational background. After graduating 
from high school, oral English skills often recede from lack of practice. Thus, 
not all educated Chinese speak English, and only a limited number of them 
speak it fl uently. Further, among the older generation and in less economically 
developed areas, English profi ciency is rare for a Chinese business person. 
Also, many people in China learned British English, or more realistically, 
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Chinglish.6 Their grasp of English is in many cases not sophisticated enough 
for communication on a subtle level for relationship building.
Other than the insuffi cient profi ciency of many Chinese business people, 
the “meaning”— the essence of communication—can be lost in translation, 
when we consider la langue, including the language, dialect, and accents 
involved. If Americans learn Mandarin Chinese, they might fi nd themselves 
having diffi culty understanding the local dialects (for example, Cantonese, 
Shanghai dialect, or Sichuan dialect), which often sound like a totally dif-
ferent language. Besides, there are over 10 written languages used in China, 
such as Mongolian, Tibetan, Korean, and Dai, which become important if 
business is conducted in ethnic regions in China.
Lack of linguistic profi ciency on the part of both the Chinese and Ameri-
can communicators can create serious misunderstanding when they interact. 
Common sense supported by the communication literature (for example, 
Hamzah-Sendut, Madsen, and E’ Thong, 1989) indicates that limited language 
profi ciency changes the dynamics of the communication process. Chinese and 
American business people need to learn each other’s languages and cultures 
to realize that in real life, words and phrases can be used differently from 
their textbook meaning.
The fi ve facilitators are pragmatism, gender equality, English, American 
pop culture, and a big country mentality (see Figure 2).
F1: Pragmatism
Geert Hofstede’s (“Hofstede’s Five,” 2010) set of fi ve cultural dimensions 
(see Table 2) rests on the indexes of each culture’s power difference (PDI), 
individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), masculinity vs. femininity (MAS), 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI), and long-term vs. short-term orientation (LTO). 
The United States and China score almost equally on the Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index. This means that both Americans and Chinese like to take 
risks, are less reliant on rules and regulations, and are happy to make their own 
decisions. This quality is in line with the idea of Americans being pragmatic 
(Dewey, 1927) and the Chinese being realistic. After all, Deng  Xiaoping, 
6 Chinglish refers to spoken or written English language that is infl uenced by the 
Chinese language and thinking. The term Chinglish usually refl ects ungrammatical 
and nonsensical English expressions in Chinese syntax. Other terms used to describe 
such English expressions with Chinese connotations include Chinese English, Sinicized 
English, or China English. It is disputed whether a Chinese variety of English shall 
be considered legitimate (Jing and Zuo, 2006; He and Li, 2009; Hu, 2004).
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Figure 2: Chinese-American Business Communication Facilitators
the paramount leader and grand designer for China’s economic reform in the 
1980s, reminded the Chinese to pay less attention to the name of the economy 
(whether capitalist, communist, or socialist), and more attention to its produc-
tivity. Deng’s analogy concerning the economy was: “Black cat or white cat, 
as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat.” The Post-Mao Chinese govern-
ment has striven to be pragmatic by avoiding dogmatism while adopting a 
free market economy for China—“a socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 
All fi gures in % Acronyms
United 
States
China World Average
Power Distance Index PDI 40 80 56.5
Individualism Index IDV 91 20 50
Masculinity Index MAS 62 66 65
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index
UAI 46 30 51
Long-term Orientation LTO 29 118 48
(Source: Geert Hofstede Website, 2010)
Table 2: Comparison of US-China Cultural Dimensions
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While negotiating business, US companies should expect Chinese partners to 
be pragmatic, wanting to strike deals, no matter how long it takes. American 
business people are pragmatic in the same way, as analyzed by John Dewey’s 
(1927) American pragmatism argument (Hickman, 1992). 
F2: Gender Equality
Decades of non-interaction between China and the United States generated 
many misconceptions in the United States about the role of women in China’s 
business world. US companies often wonder whether it is appropriate to send 
their female executives to the negotiating table and whether hiring qualifi ed 
Chinese women for management positions hurts their chances of success in 
China. According to the teachings of Confucius, a girl should defer to her 
father, a wife to her husband, and a widow to her son. On the other hand, 
Confucianism also teaches fi lial piety toward one’s parents, including the 
mother. Women’s roles in society obviously have evolved signifi cantly since 
Confucius’s days. Women stopped taking their husbands’ name when Dr. Sun 
Yatsen overturned the Qing Dynasty in 1911, long before the Communist 
takeover. Women started working outside their homes in large numbers in the 
1920s. Today, women work in most, if not all, professions and occupations 
in China. Many successful entrepreneurs are women.
Hofstede’s (“Hofstede’s Five,” 2010) index shows that the two countries 
score evenly on the masculinity-femininity index. This means that, relatively 
speaking, both countries enjoy reasonable gender equality, and fl exible gender 
role expectations for men and women at work and at home. People in both 
countries appreciate masculine goals such as success and achievement, and 
feminine goals such as a balanced life style, nurturing, and gender equality. 
The gender equality of both countries is partly due to the feminist movements 
in the United States and to the Communist movement for women’s rights in 
China. The feminist movement in the United States encompassed a number 
of social, cultural, and political issues concerned with gender inequalities 
and equal rights for women in voting and employment (Tong, 1998). The 
Communist feminism movement in China, which started in the 1920s, led by 
Chairman Mao, liberated Chinese women who were confi ned by the Confu-
cian teaching of abiding by the husband-wife structure and limited by the 
social preference of feet-binding. One of Chairman Mao’s famous sayings 
was: “Women can hold up half of the sky.” Indeed, in both countries, it is 
commonplace to fi nd women in every profession and being successful both 
at home and at work. In both societies, it is commonplace to see husband and 
wife each earning an income and sharing housework. 
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However, Chinese women encounter a glass ceiling similar to the one 
that US women do. The number of women in top leadership positions is 
extremely low given the size of the population. Habits from thousands of 
years ago die hard. There is still an unspoken, and sometimes unintentional, 
belief that at a certain level, women are inferior and less intelligent, and that 
being naïve is a virtue for women. Nonetheless, we propose that similarities 
in gender equality and gender role expectation in both countries serve more 
as a facilitator than an obstacle for people from China and America doing 
business together.
F3: English, the Global Lingua Franca
English has become a global lingua franca (Gao and Womack, 2007). English 
education has been a core focus in China’s new economy. Today there are 
roughly 200 million K–12 students learning English in China. As a result, 
there are more people speaking English than the total population of the United 
States, although their fl uency level is varied (Krieger, 2006). Interpreters 
are easily available in China for business purposes. Because many Chinese 
entrepreneurs have returned from having been overseas students in the West, 
including US English as the de facto lingua franca is especially helpful for 
American companies’ FDI in China. First, it eases the process of localization 
for corporate cultures because certain English sentences, phrases, and terms 
can simply be used verbatim. Second, it provides easy access to China’s bi-
lingual workforce. Third, it gives American companies an edge in being the 
“trendy corporations” that operate in the global language of English. It needs 
to be noted that the transfer of “meaning”—the essence of communication—is 
often obstructed by different cultural and thinking patterns, as discussed in 
the previous section. 
F4: American Pop Culture
Gao and Womack (2007) found that the globalized American popular culture, 
including Hollywood movies, MTV music, and American fashion and sports, 
is familiar to people in both countries and therefore provides common conver-
sation topics. Young people in China are becoming increasingly globalized, 
or some say “Americanized” or “modernized.” One view of globalization 
focuses on Americanization and predicts that the whole world eventually 
will be homogenized into the American cultural model (Friedman, 1999). In 
this perspective, global culture is formed through the economic and political 
domination of the United States, which exports its popular culture to the rest 
of the world (Wasserstrom, 2010). As a consequence of the globalization of 
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American popular culture, American popular cultural forms are familiar to 
people in both America and China, making American cultural icons an easy 
entry platform for casual conversations. The “not so foreign” Americanized 
culture gives American businessmen an opportunity to engage their Chinese 
counterparts in casual conversation, relationship building, and trust cultiva-
tion. The Chinese people like to use gifts to communicate, and often gifts 
with American symbols and icons, American music and scenes are desired. 
Without appearing to be imperialistic, American business people can easily 
engage their Chinese partners by conversing about familiar aspects of Ameri-
can culture while trying to learn Chinese culture and tradition.
F5: Big Country Mentality
China and the United States are the 3rd and 4th largest countries in terms of 
land mass, behind Russia and Canada. Located in the Northern hemisphere, 
both countries also have similarities in terms of latitude, climate, and terrain. 
Such huge landmasses generate a “big country” mentality for the people of 
both countries. For example, Hooke reported in the Asia Times (2007) that 
in the next 20 years China needed to buy 3,000 airplanes for its air travel 
market at a cost of over $280 billion, which is a scale comparable only to 
that of the United States. By the end of 2025, China is expected to have a 
fl eet of 3,370 aircraft, with 2,470 large planes. The country is expected to 
become the world’s second-largest civil aircraft market by 2025, according 
to Boeing. Politically, culturally, and militarily, both countries have had 
superpower status. For China, the status rests on its cultural dominance of 
Asia in the past, its current engine of economic growth, and its infl uence of 
political, economic, and military powers in the future. For the United States, 
the status rests on its hard power of military, science, and technology, and 
its soft power of globalized American culture. Such similarities result in a 
type of “big country mentality” that rests on confi dence, diversity inclusion, 
and perhaps a little bit of ethnocentrism. However, it needs to be recognized 
that the Chinese people may be viewed as more sensitive in their mentality 
than the Americans, perhaps as a result of their concern for “face saving” 
and “face giving” (Ting-Toomey, 1999) and their protective consciousness of 
China’s semi-colonial past in which imperial powers from the West exploited 
Chinese people during the Qing Dynasty, and colonized areas of China, such 
as Shanghai, Hongkong, and Shangdong Province. 
These obstacles and facilitators provide a context for US businesses in 
particular, and foreign fi rms more generally, to think through their approaches 
to the China market. The next section details how UPS approached this 
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complex business environment in the framework of the concepts developed 
in this section.
UPS GOES GLOBAL
The UPS Globalization Strategies—A Global UPS Culture
UPS has undergone a substantial globalization program in China. For instance, 
it advocates a global UPS culture to overcome the differences in national and 
regional cultures. They use a “Culture Day” strategy to educate employees 
about its organizational culture. This strategy seems to be working to over-
come the “cultural multiplicity” obstacle, while utilizing the “pragmatism,” 
“gender equality,” “English,” “the globalized American pop culture,” and 
“big country mentality” facilitators.
In 2005, after taking over Sinotrans, UPS absorbed over 2,000 new Chinese 
employees from Sinotrans and the open employment market, which posed a 
challenge to combine two national cultures and two corporate cultures into 
one entity. Alice Cheony, the UPS China District HR Director and a Singa-
porean Chinese national, said, “The fi rst thing that we worked on was the 
people . . . We gave them proper on-the-job training in a very short period 
of time through the Culture Day. We had new hire orientations, on job train-
ings, mentoring and coaching.” Sebastian Chan, the VP of UPS Supply Chain 
Operations (China) added that UPS China organized an “Execution Team” to 
apply for drivers’ licenses for all of the new UPS employees. Sebastian said: 
We don’t put a nationality on UPS culture. This UPS culture is an all-
embracing operation. The global UPS culture easily embraces various 
the national cultures. UPS is a global company that happens to have its 
headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S. However, we do obey local laws in 
different countries. We do respect local cultures and overseas customers. 
Our global employees will help us. For example, our Japanese agents will 
help us to understand the Japanese, and the German agents will help us to 
understand the German culture. We work together as a team. (UPS Focus 
Group Interview, 2007)
Another example is the “UPS Culture Day.” This is a group meeting 
facilitated by management in order to interpret and share UPS culture with 
all employees, which aims to enhance employees’ understanding of UPS in 
order to shape consistent behavior patterns and values among the employ-
ees. In China from October 2006 to October 2007, Culture Day was usually 
set on the third Wednesday of each month, each time for about 30 minutes 
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during working hours, and all employees had to participate. UPS values 
such as integrity, honesty, commitment, fairness, and self-accountability 
were introduced to all employees, as well as corporate history, stories, and 
traditions. UPS believes that a global UPS culture can surpass differences 
of national cultures between China and the United States and of corporate 
cultures between UPS and Sinotrans. One example of the UPS culture is that 
UPS employees must answer the telephone within three rings, must mention 
their name and department when picking up phones, and when transferring 
a phone call, wait for the other party to pick up the phone before hanging up 
(UPS Focus Group Interview, 2007).
UPS’s Localization Strategies
As Sebastian Chan at UPS Shanghai mentioned, UPS respects local laws and 
cultures. In fact, our research shows that UPS has gone through a thorough 
localization process to be successful in China. The various localization pro-
cesses help UPS to minimize the American “task-orientation obstacle” and 
the “business style difference obstacle.”
First, concerning human resources, UPS has hired experienced employees 
from UPS who are ethnically Chinese from the United States, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong to expedite employee training in China. In addition, 
UPS is speeding up its training and promotion of employees from Mainland 
China to refl ect the culture and dialects of its customers. 
Second, UPS gained the privilege of being the offi cial carrier for the Bei-
jing Olympics, giving UPS a special reputation in China. UPS has adapted 
its slogans for the Chinese market. For example, “What can brown do for 
you?” has never appeared on Chinese TV; instead, its status as the Beijing 
2008 Olympics sponsor appears repeatedly. As the color “brown” is not of 
particular importance in Chinese culture, UPS did not emphasize it. 
Third, UPS understands the importance of intercultural learning and 
adaptation. UPS requires a comprehensive personality assessment for its 
expatriates, wherever they originate, and encourages them to learn Chinese 
culture. Christopher Perkins, a US native who was the Business Develop-
ment Director for North and East China, stated that he went through much 
self-learning to understand Chinese culture and that UPS encouraged him 
in this undertaking. 
Fourth, UPS China adopts the Chinese relationship-oriented business style 
and emphasizes relationship cultivation. UPS also cares for its employees by 
providing daily bilingual health and safety tips in its communication. David 
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Weisser, a Business Development Manager for Eastern China, said that UPS 
China tries to demonstrate the care the company has for the employees’ 
families. Jessie Liu, HR Director for UPS China Supply Chain Solutions, 
said that if employees at UPS are transferred to a different location, UPS 
encourages them to move with the family. She added, “There were some that 
moved without family and we allowed them trips back more often. This was 
a compromise” (UPS Focus Group Interview, 2007).
The UPS Communication Standardization Strategy
UPS China adopted a very unique and effective strategy of communication 
to make sure that every employee is on the same page. This strategy is called 
the Pre-work Communications Meeting (PCM). PCM is used to convey in-
formation, provide new perspectives on a routine job, update new products 
and services, and provide safety tips. It can also be used to motivate, inform, 
or educate the staff (UPS Focus Group Interview, 2007).
Normally, the PCM reading materials are kept to no more than three pages, 
and the ideal duration of a PCM reading is less than 3 minutes. A special PCM 
on a signifi cant topic may require more time for reading and interaction with 
the audience. In general, however, PCM must be conducted at the start of 
work in the morning on every Friday no later than 9:30 am. The PCM has a 
written agenda in both Chinese and English, as with all communication sent 
via emails at UPS China (UPS China District HR—Employee Communica-
tions, Cheong, 2007).
China as Part of the UPS Global Strategy
UPS also must deal with the constantly changing Chinese business environ-
ment. Because of the nature of distribution and logistics, in the Chinese 
context, agreements must be negotiated with each local government even if 
a national agreement has been reached. This is surprisingly similar to UPS’s 
expansion across the US, when negotiations were needed for each state. 
Nonetheless, China’s membership in the WTO, and the expansion of China’s 
domestic market itself, are creating an environment where distribution services 
are allowed, and more importantly, are increasing in demand. 
While the right market conditions are crucial for a successful investment 
by a foreign fi rm, getting the communication and other cultural aspects right 
are also essential. UPS in the China context is well on its way to becoming 
a local company serving local needs, while utilizing its global standards and 
resources. 
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CONCLUSION
The case of UPS as a completely US-owned company operating in China 
provides a successful example of a US company’s global expansion strategy. 
China’s economic transition to a market economy has made the business 
environment more compatible for US companies operating in China. UPS 
has taken advantage of each stage of increased freedom in decision-making 
and the opening of China to new types of foreign business. 
Through this research, we noticed that China’s economy has become 
more market-oriented, leaving behind many of its previous characteristics, 
which were established during the planned period, and causing the Chinese 
business culture to be more Westernized, especially in metropolitan cities 
such as Shanghai and Beijing. There are many signs of maturing markets, 
growing competition, pressures within China to use standardized pricing 
arrangements and contracts, and Chinese companies that would like to see 
intellectual property protection for their own innovations. However, all is not 
resolved. UPS, for example, is now at a crossroads where it would like to build 
a comprehensive domestic distribution and logistics business within China, 
but where the fragmented nature of the market resulting from infrastructure 
and bureaucratic hurdles is standing in the way. More generally, Huang (2008) 
argues that by some measures China’s reforms in the 1980s were more pro-
gressive than those in the 1990s. The experimental character of the reforms 
has in some cases given way to industrial policy that favors certain state 
sectors and urban areas over the private sector and rural economic activity. 
Chinese-American cultural differences underscore the fact that China 
is a country where American expatriate managers must make a conscious 
effort to adjust their communication and business styles to compensate for 
the linguistic and cultural barriers. However, some US companies have been 
able to navigate the Chinese cultural and economic challenges, and even fi nd 
some affi nity with the use of English, the big country mentality stemming 
from their large domestic economies, and a mutual respect for taking risks. 
A new “transactional culture” as suggested by Varner (2000) may be in the 
making, which is tied directly to the building of transnational corporations 
(TNC) (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). The strength of a TNC rests on its abil-
ity to simultaneously achieve global effi ciency, local responsiveness, and 
worldwide innovations. A TNC produces goods and services that are tailored 
to local needs while maintaining high quality and competitive prices. This 
is achievable with innovative integration of culture, communication, and 
adaptation to the business environment on the ground. UPS is one example 
of a company that is aggressively using this strategy with its self-conscious 
165FACILITATORS AND OBSTACLES
identity as a global company serving a local community in China. UPS tries 
to think globally and act locally by avoiding the fi ve cultural obstacles and 
utilizing the fi ve cultural facilitators identifi ed in the Chinese and American 
communication framework.
The growing and dynamic China market may be the place where the 21st 
century business TNC models are incubated (Hexter and Woetzel, 2007). 
The China market is indeed important, and lessons learned about strategies 
for dealing with the differences in business environment, culture, and com-
munication are essential to US companies’ global success.
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